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VALUING  BLACK  AND  FEMALE  LIVES:
A PROPOSAL  FOR  INCORPORATING  AGENCY
VSL  INTO  TORT DAMAGES
Catherine M. Sharkey*
Federal agencies adopt a uniform VSL (value of statistical life)—one that does not vary
according to demographic characteristics—in conducting cost-benefit analyses in connection with
regulatory policy decisions.  In sharp juxtaposition, the use of race- and gender-based statistics on
wages and work-life expectancy in calculating tort wrongful death damage awards is an
entrenched practice among forensic economists who serve as expert witnesses in tort litigation.
The conventional use of race- and gender-specific economic data concerning wages and work-life
expectancy in calculating tort damages leads to unjustifiable disparities in awards for blacks and
women.  Young female and minority tort victims bear the particular brunt of the effects of dis-
criminatory and inaccurate data, given that their expected wages cannot be extrapolated from
past earning history but instead must be based on the gender- and race-based tables.
Law and economics scholars have noted that wrongful death damages in tort—based pri-
marily on earnings losses to survivors—grossly underdeter.  A damage award based on employ-
ment statistics (even those for white men) will not produce adequate deterrence against accidents
causing death.  In order to effectuate the deterrence goal of tort law, scholars have argued that
courts should change the existing method of pricing wrongful death in tort and instead incorpo-
rate the VSL methodology used by federal agencies.
In this Essay, I provide an additional argument for switching to the VSL methodology used
by agencies: incorporating a uniform VSL would ameliorate the hitherto unaddressed and unjus-
tified race and gender bias in tort awards.  The substitution of a uniform VSL for race- and
gender-based statistics addresses the racialized and gendered deterrence gap that has led to skewed
incentives for actors to take precautions against harms to blacks and women.  Moreover, with
regard to the inevitable underdeterrence/overinsurance tradeoff that arises in formulating wrong-
ful death damages, the “cost” of the overinsurance/overcompensation can be viewed as the “price”
paid in order to provide equitable treatment across demographic groups, to ensure that defend-
ants respect the same uniform duty of care for all plaintiffs, and to eradicate the perverse incen-
tives for adverse risk allocation.
© 2021 Catherine M. Sharkey.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes,
so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Segal Family Professor of Regulatory Law and Policy, New York University School of
Law.  Max Nettler (NYU 2022) provided excellent research assistance.
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I. FEDERAL AGENCIES’ UNIFORM “VALUE OF A STATISTICAL LIFE”
Professor Kip Viscusi pioneered the use of the value of a statistical life
(“VSL”) as the gold standard for agency use in cost-benefit regulatory analy-
sis.  Although there is some variation among federal agencies in terms of the
VSL, over time the range has narrowed to $6–$9 million.  Agencies, moreo-
ver, deploy a uniform VSL.  While there have been some calls to vary VSL on
the basis of income or demographic characteristics such as age, there is near
unanimous agreement that VSL should not vary by race or gender, thus valu-
ing equally black, female, and white male lives.
A. Agency Use of Average VSL
1. Methodology
The VSL is calculated by measuring the amount of money an individual
would be willing to pay to eliminate a small risk of death and then dividing
that amount by the probability of that risk.  For example, if the average
American is willing to pay $900 to eliminate a 1/10,000 risk of death, then
the average VSL would be $9 million.1  The best VSL estimates are gleaned
1 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE
(2014); W. KIP VISCUSI, PRICING LIVES: GUIDEPOSTS FOR A SAFER SOCIETY (2018).
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from data reflecting choices made by people facing risks in the work set-
ting—in other words, the wage premium they accept to face small risks of
death.  Thus, VSL is not an abstract concept conceived by agencies, but
instead tracks people’s preferences and incorporates their judgments regard-
ing willingness to accept risks.2
In conducting cost-benefit analyses for regulatory policy decisions, fed-
eral agencies use VSL as a benefits measure (in the form of lives saved) by a
regulation under consideration.  So, continuing with the simplistic example
above, if the agency uses a VSL of $9 million and a particular regulation is
projected to save 10 lives on average, then the estimated benefits are $90
million.  Cost-benefit analysis would thus favor such a regulatory policy if the
expected costs are less than $90 million and correspondingly reject the policy
if the expected costs exceed this amount.3
2. Heterogeneity
Agencies independently choose how to calculate VSLs and there is some
variation across agencies.4  In 2012, the Institute for Policy Integrity submit-
ted comments to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs’ (“OIRA”)
then-Administrator Cass Sunstein, urging that unifying the VSL across agen-
cies should be a priority.5  Sunstein has argued that VSL should not be stan-
dardized across agencies because the population is willing to pay more to
avoid certain types of risks—for example, cancer deaths—and, consequently,
risks that are particularly unpalatable should not be considered the same as
others.6
In practice today, agencies’ VSL figures coalesce around a value between
$6 and $9 million.7  A 2017 White House report noted that only three agen-
cies had issued guidance on VSL calculations but that “[i]n practice, agencies
have tended to use a value above the mid-point of” the range of VSL pro-
vided by Circular A-4, issued by the Office of Management and Budget.8
Historically, agency VSLs have varied quite significantly.  In 2011, for
example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) set the VSL at $9.1
million (while considering placing a 50% premium on cancer deaths), the
2 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 86. R
3 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 51–53. R
4 Richard L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1423, 1436–39
(2014) (charting expanding federal agency use of VSL but noting the “somewhat different
approaches to calculating VSL” between agencies).
5 Letter from Michael A. Livermore, Alex Kondo, Brian Levy & Jennifer S. Rosenberg,
members, Inst. for Pol’y Integrity to Cass Sunstein, Adm’r, Off. of Info. & Regul. Affs. (May
10, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/
2012_cb/comments/ipi-interagency-coordination-final-comments.pdf.
6 SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 87.
7 Id. at 94.
8 OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET., 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS
OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM
ACT 12 (2019).
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Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) used a VSL of $7.9 million (increas-
ing its 2008 estimate by more than half), and the Department of Transporta-
tion used a value of $6 million.9
VSL is subject not only to wide interagency variation, but also intertem-
poral variation.  In 2016 dollars, the Department of Agriculture’s VSL was
$3.6 million in 1994, but $8.9 million by 2016; similar increases have taken
place at the FDA and EPA.10  There are some outlier examples of agencies
whose figures have not kept pace even with inflation.  Consider, for example,
that in 1995, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) set its VSL at
approximately $3 million and this value had not been updated as of 2017,
rendering NRC’s VSL a third of typical federal agency estimates.11  Discrep-
ancies of this magnitude seem unlikely to be justified by small variations in
agency expectations about willingness-to-pay to avoid certain risks.
B. Variations Based on Demographics?
Some scholars have argued that, in the agency policymaking context,
VSL should vary according to the demographic group that is the target of the
policy in question in order to avoid forcing members of groups with lower
VSLs to pay more for a risk reduction than the dollar amount at which they
value that risk reduced.12  Given that taxpayers will eventually be responsible
for the costs of the policy decisions made using VSL, adopting a uniform VSL
could result in the implementation of policies that cost more than the
amount at which they are valued by their ultimate beneficiaries.13  For exam-
ple, there was a period wherein the EPA applied a “senior discount” to the
VSL for the elderly.14  This practice has since fallen out of favor.  In a draft
report to Congress, however, OIRA noted that a major source of uncertainty
for environmental regulations was that VSLs may be lower for the older
populations who disproportionately benefit from environmental
protections.15
9 Binyamin Appelbaum, As U.S. Agencies Put More Value on a Life, Businesses Fret, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/business/economy/
17regulation.html.
10 Dave Merrill, No One Values Your Life More Than the Federal Government, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-value-of-life/.
11 Richard L. Revesz, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: An Institutional Perspec-
tive, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE WORKS OF
JERRY L. MASHAW 212, 215–218 (Nicholas R. Parrillo ed., 2017).
12 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 86–87.
13 See id., at 89–90; VISCUSI, supra note 1, at 120–21.
14 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, Labor Market Estimates of the Senior Discount
for the Value of Statistical Life, 53 J. ENVT’L ECON. & MGMT. 377, 377–78 (2007).
15 OFF. OF INFO. & REG. AFFS., OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET., 2018, 2019 AND 2020 DRAFT
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 27 (2020), https://www.white
house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/2019-CATS-5899-REV_DOC-Draft2018_2019_
2020Cost_BenefitReport11_20_2019.pdf (“Some studies indicate that willingness to pay for
reductions in risk may change with age.  If VSLs do change with age, it would have an
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Using different VSLs for different groups of people could result in poli-
cies that allocate benefits to the rich being implemented more frequently
than policies that assist the poor, since the rich have a higher VSL.16  Moreo-
ver, there is some evidence that the tax system may not respond to the distrib-
utive impacts created by agency policymaking, such that higher taxes are not
imposed on the rich when they enjoy the bulk of the benefits of a new policy
and likewise the poor are not taxed more heavily when policies allocate bene-
fits in their direction.17  If it is true that the direct beneficiaries of a policy are
not made primarily responsible for paying for it, in that the tax system does
not balance each new policy benefit with a higher tax rate, then concerns
about forcing an individual to pay more for a policy than the dollar amount
at which she values that policy are less warranted since costs are spread rather
than assigned primarily to the group receiving benefits.  Indeed, using a
lower VSL for certain demographic groups would merely send more benefits
to groups with higher VSLs even though the costs of these benefits may be
shared by groups with both high and low VSLs.  Use of a nonuniform VSL in
agency decisionmaking could therefore exacerbate inequality rather than
respect individual preferences.18
With respect to evaluating heterogeneity in VSL estimates based on
demographics, most economic studies address age and income level.  But a
few tackle race and gender.  Notably, Professor Kip Viscusi has documented
that VSL is highest for white males and lowest for black males.19  Specifically,
important impact on the size of the benefits associated with premature mortality because
EPA’s analysis shows that the median age of individuals experiencing reduced mortality is
around 75 years old.  However it is also worth noting that slightly more than half of the lost
life years occur in populations age <65 due to the fact that the younger populations would
lose more life years per death than older populations.”) (footnotes omitted)).
16 See Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1649, 1656, 1681
(2018).
17 See Zachary Liscow, Are Court Orders Sticky?  Evidence on Distributional Impacts from
School Finance Litigation, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 4, 37 (2018).
18 Indeed, this effect could “snowball.”  As described by Liscow and Paez, where cer-
tain groups are assigned higher VSLs than others, the disproportionate allocation of
resources toward high-VSL groups in time period 1 would increase the relative wealth of
those groups, and—since VSL is linked to wealth—could further widen the disparity in
VSLs, leading to an allocation of resources in time period 2 that is even more dispropor-
tionate, and so on. See generally Zachary Liscow & Daniel Giraldo Paez, Inequality Snowbal-
ling (Aug. 29, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3327460).
19 W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Differences in Labor Market Values of a Statistical Life, 27 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 239, 251–53 (2003).  Leeth and Ruser also explore gender and race differen-
tials using workplace data from 1996–1998. See John D. Leeth & John Ruser, Compensating
Wage Differentials for Fatal and Nonfatal Injury Risk by Gender and Race, 27 J. RISK & UNCER-
TAINTY 257 (2003).  According to their study, women’s VSL ranges from $8.1 million to
$10.2 million; whereas men’s VSL ranges from $2.6 million to $4.7 million. Id. at 266.
They explain this differential as follows: “[M]en but not women earn[ ] higher pay for
bearing greater fatal injury risk, all else equal.  However, the concentration of women in
white-collar occupations explains much of the difference in the fatal injury rate results
between the genders.”  Id. at 258.  Moreover, “[w]hen the sample is separated by occupa-
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the overall white VSL is $15 million, more than double the overall black VSL
at $7.2 million.  And, a similar gender gap emerges: the $18.8 million VSL
figure for white males is likewise double that of the overall figure for white
females at $9.4 million.20
Racial and gender differences might arise from two very different
sources.  First, preferences with respect to risk might vary (as with age and
income level) by race.21  Second—and of particular significance in evaluat-
ing the soundness of disaggregating VSL estimates by race and/or gender—
there are fundamental differences in labor market opportunities between
blacks and whites and men and women.  The relevance of this second factor
can hardly be gainsaid, in light of “[t]he substantial literature on market dis-
crimination [that] has documented that there is a persistent difference in the
earnings of whites and blacks even after controlling for a broad set of individ-
ual characteristics and job characteristics.”22  Indeed, as Professor Kip Viscusi
has explained, “Although differences in preferences could be influential,
such differences cannot reconcile the various empirical findings.  Rather,
there must also be fundamental differences in labor market opportunities for
blacks and whites as well as in the structure of their offers for risky jobs.”23
What is key for my purposes here is that, in conducting cost-benefit anal-
yses for regulatory policy decisions, federal agencies adopt a uniform VSL in
the sense that it does not vary according to race and gender.24  In addition to
the likely political infeasibility of varying VSL estimates by race and gender,
such a practice would not be normatively desirable in light of the sources of
market failure, such as labor market discrimination.25
tional category, neither gender earns a wage premium for fatal injury risk in white-collar
jobs, but both earn a wage premium in blue-collar jobs.”  Id. at 258–59.  They also report
the striking result that black males receive no compensation for fatal workplace risks, pro-
ducing a VSL of 0. Id. at 275.
20 Viscusi, supra note 19, at 252.
21 As Viscusi explains, these race-based differences could be correlated with wealth or
represent independent differences in taste. Id. at 240 (“To the extent that black workers
have lower lifetime levels of wealth than do white workers, they should be more willing to
bear risk.  There also may be racial differences in tastes that are not correlated with wealth,
though the theoretical direction of these differences is unclear.”).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 254–55; see also id. at 255 (“[B]ecause of the differences in market opportuni-
ties, it is inappropriate to attribute the observed differences to a greater willingness by
black workers to bear risk.”).
24 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 85.
25 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Heterogeneity of the Value of Statistical Life: Introduction and Over-
view, 40 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 1, 12 (2010) (“If the observed differences are attributable to
a market failure, such as labor market discrimination, then incorporating these VSL differ-
ences in policy evaluations is unwarranted.”).
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II. DEVALUATION OF BLACK AND FEMALE LIVES IN TORT CASES
A. Current Disparities in Tort Damage Awards
Tort doctrine is explicit that damages are individuated—namely based
on the particular losses suffered by the plaintiff.  The economic component
of damages, comprised of lost wages and medical expenses, varies signifi-
cantly by a particular individual’s income level and socioeconomic status.
And noneconomic pain-and-suffering awards likewise vary by individuals’
unique characteristics.  Tort doctrine is less upfront with regard to the fact
that damages vary based on the plaintiff’s race and gender.  When it comes
time for the calculation of awards, courts have embraced the use of work-life
expectancy and wage tables constructed separately for men and women and
for whites and blacks.  Notwithstanding the racial and gender disparities that
result—including “discounting” awards in particular cases on account of a
plaintiff’s race or gender—and the fact that the use of such tables reifies
existing structural inequalities and historical patterns of participation in the
workforce, this practice has gone largely unchallenged.
1. Conventional Use of Race- and Gender-Specific Economic Data in
Damages Calculations
A key component of tort damages are economic damages based upon
past, present, and future lost earning capacity.  Women and members of
minority racial and ethnic groups have both lower expected wage estimates26
and lower work-life expectancy estimates27 than do white men.  Forensic
economists rely upon the annual wage tables published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (“BLS”) for expected wages estimates28 and upon either BLS
tables or tables developed by economists Skoog, Ciecka, and Krueger for
work-life expectancy estimates.29  The BLS wage tables provide separate sta-
tistics for men and women.30 The BLS work-life tables segregate workers into
racial groups and then differentiate by gender within each racial group, and
26 See DARIELY RODRIGUEZ & HOPE KWIATKOWSKI, LAWS. COMM. FOR C.R. UNDER L.,
HOW RACE, ETHNICITY, AND GENDER IMPACT YOUR LIFE’S WORTH: DISCRIMINATION IN CIVIL
DAMAGES AWARDS 6 (2018); Michael I. Meyerson & William Meyerson, Significant Statistics:
The Unwitting Policy Making of Mathematically Ignorant Judges, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 771, 807–08
(2010).
27 See RODRIGUEZ & KWIATKOWSKI, supra note 26, at 5; Martha Chamallas, Questioning
the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional
Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 81–82 (1994) [hereinafter Chamallas, A Constitutional
Argument]; Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 463, 481 (1998).
28 See Kimberly A. Yuracko & Ronen Avraham, Valuing Black Lives: A Constitutional
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the tables by Skoog, Ciecka, and Krueger outline work-life expectancies by
gender at various levels of educational attainment.31
Myriad cases illustrate the conventional use of gender- and race-based
tables.32  Even when using the tables that do not distinguish by race, it is
nevertheless common practice for forensic economists to modify estimates so
that they reflect the racial group to which the plaintiff belongs.33
The use of such gender- and race-based tables reifies and perpetuates
structural inequities.  To the extent that the lower wage estimates for women
and members of minority racial/ethnic groups reflect, at least to some
degree, structural inequities and historical injustices, these are incorporated
into tort damage estimates.34  Similarly, to the extent that minority patients
receive inferior healthcare treatment,35 this affects not only expected medi-
cal expenses, but also life expectancy, that likewise will be incorporated into
depressed tort damages estimates.
Moreover, such gender- and race-based tables are inaccurate predictors
of the future.  The table figures are static, meaning they reflect a snapshot of
the time period from which the data were collected without accounting for
trends that were evolving over that time period.  The use of static figures rests
on the assumption that whatever discrepancies exist between demographic
groups will not only persist but also remain constant into the future.36  Spe-
cifically, such figures do not capture the emerging legal,37 professional,38
and social norms39 that favor workplace equality and increase the likelihood
that discrepancies in employment data between demographic groups will
diminish in the future.  Young female and minority tort victims bear the par-
ticular brunt of the effects of discriminatory and inaccurate data, given that
31 See Ronen Avraham & Kimberly Yuracko, Torts and Discrimination, 78 OHIO ST. L.J.
661, 674 (2017).
32 See, e.g., Dershowitz v. United States, No. 12-CV-08634, 2015 WL 1573321, at *21
(S.D.N.Y. April 8, 2015); Athridge v. Iglesias, 950 F. Supp. 1187, 1192–93 (D.D.C. 1996);
Caron v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 378, 397–98 (D.R.I. 1976); Frankel v. United States,
321 F. Supp. 1331, 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Allen v. State, 535 So. 2d 903, 913 (La. Ct. App.
1988); Powell v. Parker, 303 S.E.2d 225, 228 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); Johnson v. Misericordia
Cmty. Hosp., 294 N.W.2d 501, 527 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980); see also Avraham & Yuracko, supra
note 31; Chamallas, A Constitutional Argument, supra note 27; Yuracko & Avraham, supra
note 28.
33 See Yuracko & Avraham, supra note 28, at 331.
34 See Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Replicating and Perpetuating Inequalities in Personal Injury
Claims Through Female-Specific Contingencies, 49 MCGILL L.J. 309, 311 (2004); Chamallas, A
Constitutional Argument, supra note 27, at 75; Meyerson & Meyerson, supra note 26, at
806–07.
35 See Yuracko & Avraham, supra note 28, at 335–36; cf. Avraham & Yuracko, supra
note 31, at 688–90.
36 See Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 31, at 700; Chamallas, A Constitutional Argument,
supra note 27, at 75; Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and
the Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1435, 1452–53 (2005).
37 See RODRIGUEZ & KWIATKOWSKI, supra note 26, at 7–8.
38 See id. at 8.
39 See Adjin-Tettey, supra note 34, at 328–29.
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their expected wages cannot be extrapolated from past earning history but
instead must be based on the gender- and race-based historical tables.
2. Largely Unchallenged Industry Practice
The use of gender- and race-based statistics to calculate tort damage
awards has become an entrenched practice among forensic economists who
serve as expert witnesses in personal injury litigation.  As one economist who
had “performed thousands of lost income analyses” testified, “no one had
ever asked him to provide race- and sex-neutral calculations in wrongful
death cases.”40  In a survey by the National Association of Forensic Econo-
mists, 42.4% of respondents indicated that they would use gender-specific
data in calculating a lost earning award, and an additional 44.8% said they
would use both gender- and race-specific data.41
In the legislative sphere, a few states have enacted statutes that codify
gender- and race-neutral tables or have jury instructions that favor the use of
such tables.42  At the federal level, the proposed Fair Calculations in Civil
Damages Act of 2016 would prohibit federal courts from awarding civil dam-
ages “using a calculation for the projected future earning potential of [a]
plaintiff that takes into account the race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or actual
or perceived sexual orientation of the plaintiff,” but the bill died in commit-
tee in both the House and Senate.43
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, courts entertained a limited
number of challenges to the use of race- and gender-based tables in the cal-
culation of damages awards; but, even in the twenty-first century, these cases
remain distinct outliers.44  Judge Weinstein, a recently retired federal district
40 United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1315 (D. Utah 2004).
41 RODRIGUEZ & KWIATKOWSKI, supra note 26, at 3.
42 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3361 (West 2021) (“Estimations, measures, or calculations of
past, present, or future damages for lost earnings or impaired earning capacity resulting
from personal injury or wrongful death shall not be reduced based on race, ethnicity, or
gender.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.770 (2019) (“A calculation of the projected future earning
potential of the plaintiff that takes into account the race or ethnicity of the plaintiff is
inadmissible in any civil action.”); Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 31, at 680–81.  New
Jersey is the only state with a pattern jury instruction that favors both gender- and race-
neutral tables. Compare Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 31, at 681 n.101 (“Of the states
that we examined, only New Jersey’s court rules identified tables that were gender-neu-
tral”), with id. at 681 n.102 (“New Jersey . . . expressed a preference for race-neutral tables
or statistics.”).  Five states have pattern jury instructions that favor race-neutral statistics but
nonetheless allow gendered tables. See ALASKA CIV. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 20.13
(1990); CAL. CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3932 (2007); 4A MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUC-
TION GUIDES—CIVIL § 91.85 (2020), Westlaw CIVJIG; NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS—CIVIL, div. 2 app. A, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2020); 6 WASHINGTON
PRACTICE, WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL § 34.04 (2019), Westlaw WPI.
43 See RODRIGUEZ & KWIATKOWSKI, supra note 26, at 8–9 (quoting Fair Calculations in
Civil Damages Act of 2016, S. 3489, 114th Cong. § 3(a) (2016)).
44 See, e.g., Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 368 (6th Cir. 1978); Reilly v.
United States, 665 F. Supp. 976, 997 (D.R.I. 1987); Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771 F.
Supp. 427, 455 (D.D.C. 1991); Childs v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 1570, 1585 (S.D. Ga.
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court judge characterized by the New York Times as “the quintessential activist
jurist [who used] his longtime perch on the federal bench in Brooklyn to
champion causes,”45 took up the gauntlet in opposition to the use of such
tables, rejecting the practice (an issue the judge raised sua sponte in one case)
in two published decisions on both public policy and constitutional
grounds.46  But, for the most part, other judges have not followed his lead.47
Given the attention drawn to the discriminatory impact of the use of
such tables—by Judge Weinstein’s decisions, Special Master Kenneth Fein-
berg’s decision to use the male tables for both male and female victims of
9/11 in the Victims’ Compensation Fund,48 academic critiques,49 torts
casebooks,50 and outrage expressed in the press51—it remains a bit of a puz-
zle why attorneys mount (and thus courts entertain) relatively few challenges
to the practice.52  Prevailing partial explanations include: (i) personal-injury
1996); Childers v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 96–194V, 1999 WL 218893, at *56
(Fed. Cl. Mar. 26, 1999); United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1319 (D. Utah
2004); see also Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 31; Chamallas, A Constitutional Argument,
supra note 27; Yuracko & Avraham, supra note 28.
45 Alan Feuer, A Legal Lion Lays Down His Gavel with a Ruling of “Love, Not Hate,” N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/nyregion/judge-jack-wein-
stein-retirement.html.
46 See G.M.M. v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 148–49, 152–54 (E.D.N.Y. 2015);
McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 255–56 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
47 Judge Weinstein’s two decisions have been cited for rejection of the use of such
tables in two other cases, both of which were brought in Judge Weinstein’s own district. See
Cedeno v. Broan-Nutone, LLC, No. 16-CV-796, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169027, at *30 n.15
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019); Hwang v. Grace Rd. Church, No. 14-CV-7187, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 164450, at *23 n.9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2018).
48 Chamallas, supra note 36, at 1444–45 (explaining that Feinberg decided to use male
statistics for all victims, influenced by filings submitted by National Organization for
Women).
49 See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE,
GENDER, AND TORT LAW 156 (2010); Chamallas, supra note 36; Yuracko & Avraham, supra
note 28.
50 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 805–07 (12th ed. 2020) (discussing how “work-life expectancy calculations have
come under increasing scrutiny” in academic literature and in practice in the United States
and in Israel).
51 See, e.g., Kim Soffen, In One Corner of the Law, Minorities and Women Are Often Valued
Less, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/business/
wonk/settlements/.
52 In Banda v. Herc Rentals, Inc., No. 18-CV-05329-JCS, 2020 WL 353461 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
21, 2020), the plaintiff’s attorney raised an objection (citing McMillan v. City of New York,
253 F.R.D. 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)) to the forensic expert’s consideration of race to reduce
work-life expectancy.  Notwithstanding the expert’s testimony that if consideration of race
were removed and everything else stayed the same the statistical work-life expectancy
would be higher, upon review it turned out that the “statistics for males generally with the
same level of education as [plaintiff], as reflected in the publication upon which [defen-
dant’s expert] relied, show a shorter worklife expectancy than for Hispanic males with that
level of education.”  The plaintiff’s attorney accordingly withdrew the objection.  This rare
example of a plaintiff attorney’s challenge sheds light on the complex interaction among
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-4\NDL406.txt unknown Seq: 11  9-APR-21 18:05
2021] valuing  black  and  female  lives 1489
litigation is removed from the civil rights context;53 (ii) expert witnesses may
feel pressured to make calculations with official statistics, which delineate by
gender and race;54 (iii) the tort system is a necessarily individualized sphere
of law, treating each case as unique and with comparison between damage
awards taking place only rarely;55 and (iv) legal academics have neglected the
topic, which is seen as the purview of legal practice, not the domain for theo-
retical exploration.56
B. A Racialized and Gendered Deterrence Gap
1. Theoretical “Misalignment” in Tort
Ariel Porat has most prominently identified the “misalignment” in tort
between the notion of a duty of care owed by a defendant to all persons
(regardless of individual characteristics, including demographics) juxtaposed
against the reality that defendants will take care only to the point at which
the marginal expected cost of precautions (B) equals the marginal expected
damages (P*L).57  Thus, for example, if the duty of care were set at a level of
precautions that cost $100, but the expected damages for injuring a female
or minority plaintiff amounted only to $50, then the defendant would not
take care in excess of $50 when engaging in activities that threatened injury
to women and minorities, whereas, the defendant would be willing to take
precautions up to $100 when white male plaintiffs would be susceptible.58
The use of gender- and race-based tables in the calculation of damages
thereby creates incentives for defendants to direct risky and harmful conduct
toward minority communities.59  Given the lower expected damages, female
and black plaintiffs are also less desirable as clients in our contingency-fee
driven system.  Such knowledge on behalf of defendants can further skew
their incentives to act with less care when interacting with these minority
individuals or groups.  Caps on noneconomic damages, moreover, exacer-
bate this effect, as they limit the extent to which pain and suffering and other
demographic characteristics—in this case, taking into account educational attainment
within a minority ethnic/racial group—that might also explain how a challenge to the use
of race- or gender-based tables might not always serve the interests of particular plaintiffs.
53 See Chamallas, supra note 36, at 1437.
54 See id. at 1452.
55 Jennifer B. Wriggins, Constitutional Law and Tort Law: Injury, Race, Gender, and Equal
Protection, 63 ME. L. REV. 263, 268 (2010); Jennifer B. Wriggins, Torts, Race, and the Value of
Injury, 1900-1949, 49 HOW. L.J. 99, 102–03 (2005).
56 Chamallas, A Constitutional Argument, supra note 27, at 76.
57 Ariel Porat, The Future of Law and Economics and the Calabresian External Moral Costs 9
(Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in L. & Econ., No. 787, 2016), https://chicagoun
bound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2481&context=law_and_economics.
58 See Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 98–99 (2011).
59 See Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 31, at 697–98; Yuracko & Avraham, supra note
28, at 327, 334–35.
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categories apart from lost earning capacity might increase expected
damages.60
2. Empirical Evidence
There is some limited empirical evidence to support the misalignment
thesis and more specifically a racialized and gendered deterrence gap.  A sali-
ent example arises in the context of lead paint abatement.  Minority children
have the highest rates of lead poisoning.61  Given that the victims of lead
poisoning are mostly young children, defendant manufacturers can expect
with a high degree of confidence that courts will rely on gender- and race-
based tables.  Thus, when contemplating lead paint abatement activities,
defendants are incentivized to begin (and perhaps end) abatement in major-
ity white neighborhoods (where expected damages are the highest).62
Indeed, Judge Weinstein discussed the risk-allocation issues caused by gen-
der- and race-based tables in the context of G.M.M v. Kimpson, a case involv-
ing lead poisoning of a Hispanic infant.63
In a similar vein, there is some evidence that minority neighborhoods
have higher rates of accidents involving chemical facilities.64  Studies also
reveal that areas with higher concentrations of racial and ethnic minorities
are more likely to be chosen as the sites for hazardous-waste facilities or other
locally undesirable land uses by private actors.65
Finally, there is evidence that blacks are underrepresented by attorneys
relative to their proportion of the total American population, which corre-
lates with the contention that race- and gender-based tables make it more
difficult for blacks to find attorneys who are willing to take them on as cli-
ents.66  Attorneys, moreover, have stated that, after caps on noneconomic
damages were adopted, they began screening potential clients more thor-
oughly for personal characteristics such as work and criminal history (which
are highly correlated with race and gender).67
60 See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 49, at 156; Avraham & Yuracko, supra note
31, at 690.
61 See RODRIGUEZ & KWIATKOWSKI, supra note 26, at 3–4; Avraham & Yuracko, supra
note 31, at 687–88.
62 See Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 31, at 688.
63 See 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
64 See RODRIGUEZ & KWIATKOWSKI, supra note 26, at 4; Yuracko & Avraham, supra note
28, at 335.
65 See RODRIGUEZ & KWIATKOWSKI, supra note 26, at 4–5; Paul Mohai & Robin Saha,
Which Came First, People or Pollution? Assessing the Disparate Siting and Post-Siting Demographic
Change Hypotheses of Environmental Injustice, ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS, Nov 18, 2015, at 1, 14–16
(2015); Kathy Seward Northern, Battery and Beyond: A Tort Law Response to Environmental
Racism, 21 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 499–500, 502–03 (1997).
66 See Jennifer B. Wriggins, Damages in Tort Litigation: Thoughts on Race and Remedies,
1865–2007, 27 REV. LITIGATION 37, 59 (2007).
67 Blacks still have higher rates of unemployment, arrest, and conviction than do
whites. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 49, at 178.  Women may be similarly disad-
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III. REFORM PROPOSAL: INCORPORATING AGENCY VSL INTO TORT DAMAGES
CALCULATIONS
Prominent academics have urged the incorporation of VSL methodol-
ogy into the calculation of tort damages for wrongful death, as a measure of
the dollar amount at which the deceased valued her life.68  Critics have
decried such proposals on the ground that the purpose of tort damages is to
make the plaintiff whole—indeed, at common law, when the plaintiff died,
no damages were given; the entire basis of wrongful-death damages is statu-
tory, and most state statutes provide compensation based upon financial
losses to survivors and reject the notion of hedonic (or loss of the value of
life) damages.69
But if tort law is to fulfill a deterrence goal, then it cannot be gainsaid
that wrongful death damages dramatically underdeter.  If one were to graph
average tort awards on an x-axis of severity, from minor injuries, to more
serious, to grave injuries, then death, there would be an upward-sloping line
from minor to grave injuries and then a plunge downwards for death.70
Thus, separate and apart from the race- and gender-based “discounts,” even
if courts utilize work-life statistics for white men, wrongful-death damages
would not adequately deter.
To satisfy the deterrence goal, courts should pivot to using VSL mea-
sures.71  Professor Kip Viscusi has advocated the use of VSL in wrongful-
death cases in which punitive damages are warranted, so as to target situa-
tions in which the incentives for deterrence are paramount.72  But tying dam-
ages to the VSL metric for wrongful deaths more generally ensures that the
appropriate duty of care is set and therefore that the adequate level of deter-
rence is achieved, even in cases that do not warrant punitive damages.  VSL
not only provides the correct value for a saved life, but also frames safety
decisions in prospective terms, which is the more relevant way to assess the
defendant’s behavior when determining whether or not a defendant should
be held liable.73
A. Novel Deterrence Argument: Addressing the Racialized/Gendered
Deterrence Gap
Against the backdrop of the consistent, systematic use of race- and gen-
der-based tables used in the calculation of tort damages (described in Part
II), I propose a new angle on the debate regarding the incorporation of VSL
vantaged in their ability to acquire legal representation by their lower employment rates
relative to men.
68 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1; VISCUSI, supra note 1.
69 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages
Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 441–42 (2005).
70 See id. at 469–71.
71 See VISCUSI, supra note 1, at 84–85.
72 See id. at 215–16.
73 See id. at 199–200.
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into wrongful-death damages—namely that this would address the skewed
incentives with respect to taking precautions to protect women and
minorities.
The argument is simple, yet its implications profound.  Relying upon a
uniform VSL in assessing damages would solve the problem of women and
members of minority racial and ethnic groups receiving depressed damages
awards as a result of past (and ongoing) discrimination; moreover, it would
be in line with trends toward convergence in wages and workforce-participa-
tion rates between demographic groups.  The adoption of a uniform VSL as a
measure of tort wrongful-death damages would eliminate the perverse incen-
tives for defendants to channel their most risk-laden behavior toward minor-
ity communities.
B. Caveats
Here I try to respond to one well-known caveat with respect to the incor-
poration of VSL into tort damages for deterrence-based reasons and also
raise a more novel concern introduced by injecting agency practice into the
tort realm.
1. Overcompensation/Overinsurance Concerns
Economists have long pointed out that basing damages on VSL is likely
to overcompensate victims for their injury, in that the amount exceeds the
amount an individual would choose to insure against.74  It is difficult to eval-
uate the extent of potential overcompensation/overinsurance, however,
given well-known issues of underdetection and other issues leading to
underdeterrence of tort defendants.75  Even though some plaintiffs may
receive excessive compensation for their injuries, others may not receive any
compensation at all despite being equally entitled to recover.  The issue of
overcompensation/overinsurance may thus be mitigated at the group level.
Here I highlight an additional comparative point—namely, the balance
that incorporation of VSL into tort damages strikes in favor of trading off
overinsurance against underdeterrence is preferable to the racialized and
gendered deterrence gap created by the conventional use of race- and gen-
der-based tables in the calculation of tort damages.  Seen in this light, the
“cost” of overinsurance/overcompensation can be viewed as the “price” paid
in order to provide equitable treatment across demographic groups, to
ensure that defendants respect the same uniform duty of care for all plain-
tiffs, and to eradicate the perverse incentives for adverse risk allocation.
74 See id. at 198–99.
75 For example, if the likelihood that a defendant who does not satisfy the duty of care
will be held liable is only fifty percent, then it may be necessary to impose damages equal
to, 2 x VSL, in order to produce sufficient deterrence. See id. at 85–86.
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2. Race and Gender Bias in Agency Decisionmaking?
The argument for the incorporation of agency VSL methodology into
the tort realm in order to mitigate a racialized and gendered deterrence gap
raises a more novel concern—namely, the danger that agency methodology
and practice might themselves be tainted by racial and/or gender bias.
It is difficult to get a handle on how to evaluate this concern.  But there
are some worrisome signs.  First, there is evidence to suggest that the govern-
ment settles environmental suits brought against it differently depending on
whether the plaintiff is white or belongs to a minority group76 and penalizes
law-violating polluters differently based on whether the polluting was done in
a white or minority community.77  Some studies have also shown that areas
with higher concentrations of racial and ethnic minorities are more likely to
be chosen as the sites for hazardous-waste facilities or other locally undesir-
able land uses by the government.78
CONCLUSION: HARNESSING EFFICIENCY ARGUMENTS IN THE
SERVICE OF JUSTICE
In this Essay, I present a fresh take on an age-old problem—namely, how
to set the optimal level of wrongful-death damages in light of the inevitable
tradeoff between underdeterrence and overcompensation/overinsurance.
Placing a thumb on the deterrence side of the scale and arguing for the
incorporation of agency VSL into wrongful death damages is justified so as to
provide equitable treatment across demographic groups, to ensure that
defendants respect the same uniform duty of care for all plaintiffs, and to
eradicate the perverse incentives for adverse risk allocation.  Young female
and minority children bear the brunt of the effects of discriminatory and
inaccurate data, given that their expected wages cannot be extrapolated from
past earning history but instead must be based on the gender- and race-based
tables.  The reform proposal thus harnesses efficiency arguments ultimately
in the service of justice.
76 Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 31, at 691–92.
77 See Northern, supra note 65, at 505–06.
78 See id. at 502; Avraham & Yuracko, supra note 31, at 691; Yuracko & Avraham, supra
note 28, at 335–36.
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